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Guilt poses a unique evolutionary problem. Unlike other dysphoric emotions, it is not 
immediately clear what its adaptive significance is. One can imagine thriving despite or even 
because of a lack of guilt. In this paper, we review solutions offered by Scott James, Richard 
Joyce, and Robert Frank and show that, although their solutions have merit, none adequately 
solves the puzzle. We offer an alternative solution, one that emphasizes the role of empathy and 
post-transgression behavior in the evolution of guilt. Our solution, we contend, offers a better 
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1. Introduction. Many emotions strike us as biologically adaptive. Fear, for example, fires our 
body into action, increasing our heart rate, heightening our awareness, and setting us poised for 
fighting or fleeing. The individual for whom a charging lion or looming bus does not summon 
fear will not fare well in the game of life. Some unusual fears—of clowns or escalators, say—
might be sources of debilitating phobias, but such cases tend not to lead us to question whether 
fear plays an overall adaptive role in our species. Guilt, in contrast, presents more of an 
evolutionary puzzle. While it is hard to imagine someone who never experiences fear flourishing 
in life, it is not difficult to imagine an individual thriving despite—or perhaps even because of—
a lack of guilt, particularly if that individual is adept at concealing transgressions. Might not such 
individuals have had an evolutionary advantage over those who experience guilt? If so, how do 
we account for guilt’s evolution?  
Perhaps the most prominent evolutionary accounts of guilt are those developed by Frank 
(1988), Joyce (2006), and Scott (2011). Their accounts converge on a similar conclusion 
regarding the evolutionary role of guilt; namely, experiences of guilt were adaptive for 
individuals because they served as a countervailing force against motivations to defect on 
cooperative arrangements or transgress communally accepted normative standards. These 
accounts take guilt to have evolved to reinforce important prosocial behaviors and to help sustain 
cooperative arrangements among early humans.  
While we agree with these broad claims, we argue that they are insufficient for explaining 
how guilt achieved an evolutionary foothold in humans. Focusing almost exclusively on what 
some philosophers have dubbed “anticipatory guilt” (e.g., Greenspan 1995), these accounts say 
relatively little about two other important aspects of guilt and guilt-induced behavior, which also 




number of maladaptive effects on the individual, including social withdrawal and 
psychopathologies (Averill et al., 2002; Bybee and Quiles, 1998; Harder, 1995; Luyten, et al., 
2002). This is not to say that if an emotion is an adaptation it can have no associated maladaptive 
effects. But from a retrospective evolutionary account, we should ask how the benefits of the 
trait might have overweighed its plausible costs. Second, and perhaps more importantly, any 
plausible individual-level1 evolutionary account of guilt must explain not just why the effects of 
guilt were on balance adaptive for the individual, but also why members of a community would 
have responded positively toward individuals who expressed transgression-induced guilt. Why 
would the community members respond favorably to such individuals through, say, forgiveness 
or restoration to communal grace, rather than, say, taking the opportunity to exploit or severely 
punish them? From an evolutionary standpoint, explaining stereotypical behaviors motivated by 
posttransgression guilt seems to be especially important.  
 In this paper, we argue that these previous accounts fail to explain fully why guilt was 
adaptive at the individual level, and we provide the outlines of an evolutionary explanation of 
guilt that aims to account not just for its commonly identified adaptive features, but also for its 
apparent maladaptive effects and for the tendency of social groups to forgive and reincorporate 
guilt-prone individuals. Drawing from the philosophical and empirical literature on guilt, we 
provide in section 2 a characterization of guilt, its action tendencies, and the role it plays in 
	
1 It is also possible that guilt evolved in part due to group-level selection (Deem and Ramsey 
2016). We focus here on individual-level accounts of guilt, not because we hold that group-level 
selection for guilt did not occur, but because we want to investigate whether a purely individual-




contemporary social contexts. In section 3, we assess the details of Frank’s, Joyce’s, and James’s 
evolutionary accounts of guilt. While we acknowledge that each sheds some light on guilt’s 
origin, we argue that each falls short of explaining guilt within an individual-level selectionist 
framework. Finally, in section 4, we argue that the previous accounts are missing an important 
component—empathic concern—which can help explain communal responses to guilt, and how 
guilt-proneness can be individually adaptive. Our shift toward communal responses to guilt does 
not diminish the significance of these accounts. Rather, our explanation complements them, 
showing that the evolution of guilt was likely the result of the interplay of the early emergence of 
posttransgression feelings of self-recrimination in individuals, an established suite of prosocial 
emotions underwriting cooperative enterprises, and an informationally and normatively rich 
social environment.  
 
2. Guilt’s nature and function. Following recent trends in emotion research and developmental 
psychology, we consider guilt to be a distinct emotion, differentiated from other emotions 
according to its relatively late developmental emergence in humans, its observed cross-cultural 
presence, and its unique behavioral profile (Fowers 2015; Tangney et al. 2013; Teroni and 
Deonna 2008; Treeby et al. 2016).   
 Because many emotions evolved to play specific adaptive roles within ecologies 
significantly different from those of the present, evolutionary accounts of such emotions will be 
speculative to some degree. This is particularly true of an emotion like guilt, which is tightly 
linked to complex social behaviors that play an important role in the moral, social, and legal lives 




 Our account here operates under the presupposition and not proof that guilt is an 
adaptation.2 Despite this limitation, one can hedge an evolutionary account of guilt against the 
charge of being another just-so story by providing a conceptually clear and empirically informed 
picture of guilt and its behavioral profile. Drawing from contemporary psychology, comparative 
biology, phylogenetics, and social scientific research programs on guilt and its social role, we 
can find clues about guilt’s original function and thereby avoid an altogether speculative picture 
of how guilt was initially adaptive. And while guilt plays a somewhat heterogeneous set of roles 
within and across contemporary cultures, there are also patterns of similarity in the psychology 
and social roles it plays—patterns that are likely to extend into the distant past. Thus, the effects 
guilt has on the individual and the roles its expression plays in contemporary social contexts 
provide some evidence about its original evolutionary function. Further situating guilt within the 
ecological and social conditions in which it likely emerged in humans, and considering other 
cognitive and affective traits that we have good reason to think were already present at this 
emergence, prevents our account from being overly speculative (Griffiths 1997; Sterelny 2012). 
	
2 Prinz offers a non-evolutionary account of guilt, in which he asserts, but does not defend, the 
view that guilt is “a product of nurture that builds on other emotions, a desire for affection, and a 
general capacity for learning” (Prinz 2004, 129). It is not clear, however, how one adjudicates 
simplicity or conservativism among evolutionary accounts and Prinz’s multi-factorial composite 
account. Further, the neurological, biological, and psychological research largely portrays guilt 
to be a distinct adaptation that is modulated by culture, defying a simple innate vs. learned 




 Much of the psychological research on guilt converges on several core phenomenological 
and cognitive elements. Research subjects routinely group guilt with other psychologically 
painful emotions, such as shame (Harder 1995; Tracy and Robins 2006), and typically identify 
guilt’s object as a particular set of past actions that constitute transgressions against accepted 
normative standards (Tangney et al. 2011). The tight link between guilt experiences and the 
attending judgment that one is responsible for such transgressions underwrites one dominant 
characterization of guilt by the psychological sciences as a primarily action-focused emotion, in 
contrast to other psychologically painful emotions, such as shame, that focus chiefly on some 
aspect of the self (Barrett 1995; Drummond et al., 2017; Tangney 1996).3 
In addition to these core phenomenological aspects of guilt experiences, the anticipation 
of guilt and posttransgression experiences of guilt powerfully alter an individual’s motivational 
profile and behavior. Anticipatory guilt can serve as a powerful counterweight to motivation for 
actions that transgress accepted standards, defect on cooperative arrangements, or harm others 
	
3 We remain neutral on whether guilt arises from the transgression of a moral standard or social 
norm itself, or from undermining a standard or norm that one personally values. Batson, for 
example, contends that guilt arises when one anticipates violating a norm that one values, rather 
than from norm violation generally (Batson 2015). According to Batson, this perspective on guilt 
helps to explain why individuals are sometimes disposed to merely appear to adhere to some 
social norms while concealing their transgression of these same norms. Our account of guilt’s 
evolution is compatible with Batson’s picture, since we do not argue that guilt is experienced and 
acted upon with every conscious transgression. However, as even Batson notes with respect to 




(Batson 2015; Svensson et al. 2013). In posttransgression scenarios, guilt typically motivates 
reparative actions on the part of the transgressor, particularly toward those directly harmed, as 
well as self-punitive behavior, including acceptance of punishment or self-administered penance 
(Lindsay-Hartz et al. 1995; Radzik 2009; Silfver 2007). 
 The sociological and legal literature provide a fuller picture of the emotion’s social 
function. The expression of guilt pulls in two directions within the legal arena. If someone who is 
accused of a crime exhibits remorseful behavior, this behavior will often be taken as evidence 
that they are responsible for the crime (Bornstein et al. 2002; Jehle et al. 2009). While displays of 
remorse make it more likely that one will be convicted of a crime, in Western legal systems 
remorse generally has a dampening effect on sentencing (Garvey 1998; Gold and Weiner 2000). 
This phenomenon might be explained in two ways. One is that the experience of remorse 
itself could be considered punishment, so the court is not moved to inflict as much external 
punishment in order to receive parity of punishment with the remorseless. Another explanation is 
that individuals who exhibit remorse are indicating that they are unlikely to recidivate, that is, 
commit the same or a similar crime again (Hosser et al. 2008). Either option, or even a 
combination of the two, explains why expressions of guilt can benefit individuals in certain 
contexts, despite incurring some cost. And with additional premises (like transgressions should 
receive parity of punishment, or that the function of punishment is crime reduction), one can 
account for why judges or juries should view guilt expressions as mitigating factors in 
sentencing. But both explanations already assume at least a loosely structured penal procedure 
that already acknowledges that posttransgression expressions of guilt regularly occur. What 
evolutionary pressures would have resulted in these posttransgression expressions of guilt being 




representative accounts of the evolution of guilt from the behavioral scientific and philosophical 
literature. While these accounts provide important insights into the effects of guilt on the 
individual, we contend that each contains serious deficiencies in accounting for the evolutionary 
emergence and maintenance of guilt.  
 
3. Recent individual-level accounts and their shortcomings. Recent evolutionary accounts of 
guilt in the philosophical and scientific literature have drawn the conclusion that guilt proneness 
is a straightforwardly adaptive trait, given that it prompts prosocial and reparative behaviors 
(e.g., Broom 2003; de Waal 1996; James 2011; Joyce 2006). But such prosocial and reparative 
behavior cannot be taken for granted. It is not clear why at guilt’s emergence guilt-prone 
individuals were not just taken advantage of when guilt was expressed after transgression, 
quashing its subsequent evolution. Even if we were to conjecture that an important benefit of 
guilt expression is that the group views guilt experiences as the individual imposing self-
punishment, which helps to explain dampening effects of guilt expression on sentencing in 
contemporary legal contexts, we would still need to determine why members of early human 
groups initially responded to guilt expressions in this way.  
The forgoing considerations of the nature and contemporary effects of guilt show us 
precisely what an individual-level evolutionary account of guilt requires. Such an account must 
explain not only how the prosocial and reparative actions that guilt induces would have provided 
benefits to the individual, but also why the guilt expressions of norm transgressors tended to 
influence group response in ways that were beneficial to individuals. And, more specifically, 




difficult evolutionary story tell—namely, why posttransgression psychosocial effects and 
behaviors that appear to be costly to the individual would have been favored by selection.  
 
3.1 Frank’s commitment model of guilt. Frank (1988) includes guilt among a suite of emotions 
that, he contends, evolved to enable individuals to make credible commitments with one another, 
yielding long-term payoffs. On Frank’s view, these payoffs are more likely to be realized if 
individuals maintain a firm commitment to cooperative arrangements, even when one or more 
party stands to benefit more by pursuing a strictly self-interested course of action at the expense 
of other group members. According to Frank, emotions underwrite cooperation in two ways. 
First, emotions such as love, envy, and guilt incentivize individuals to follow cooperative terms 
and provide a counterweight to impulses to cheat or defect. For instance, the anticipation of guilt 
can diminish the allure of cheating for a larger individual payoff. Second, individuals who are 
recognized as disposed to experience emotions like guilt and sympathy will be sought out by 
others for cooperative ventures. 
 Frank suggests two evolutionary pathways by which emotions might have emerged. First, 
along the “reputation pathway,” individuals who consistently resist the strong urge to cheat 
acquire a good reputation, the transmission of which leads to further opportunities to benefit 
through cooperative ventures. Second, along the “sincere-manner pathway,” the experience of 
emotions is associated with involuntary, hard-to-fake facial expressions, which others can use to 
draw inferences about whether an individual is a reliable cooperator. In both scenarios, the 
choice of reliable cooperators increases the selective pressure on emotional dispositions.  
 Because Frank counts guilt among the emotions favored by selection to serve as 




evolutionary scenario for guilt’s emergence. Consider first the sincere-manner pathway. 
Empirical studies on emotions and their associated facial expressions have shown that, in 
contrast to other social emotions, there is little evidence that guilt is associated with a 
stereotypical bodily signal by which it can be readily identified (Keltner et al., 1996; Wallbott 
1998). Prinz (2004), for one, takes the lack of evidence for a distinctive physiological signal for 
guilt as reason to suppose that guilt did not emerge along the sincere-manner pathway. However, 
as we will argue in section 4, a modified version of this account yields considerable explanatory 
power. Much turns on whether the sincere signal needs to be an involuntary physiological 
change. But for now, let’s consider whether Frank’s reputation pathway might fare better.  
 While reputation might have played some role in the evolution of guilt proneness, 
Frank’s account does not explain why guilt proneness was itself a particular target of selection. 
Outside parties would be making inferences only about an individual’s adherence to cooperative 
terms or general disposition to experience some set of social emotions. But whether the 
anticipation of guilt—and not, say, sympathy or fear—induces commitment in a given instance 
of cooperation would be opaque to observers. By merely positing that guilt was among a host of 
prosocial emotions that came under selection pressure at some point because they contributed to 
beneficial cooperative ventures, the reputation pathway fails to explain why selective pressures 
would have targeted guilt specifically, leaving guilt’s function undifferentiated from those of 
other prosocial emotions. On this view of guilt, we are warranted only in concluding that these 
pressures targeted whichever dispositions happened to be present, guilt or no guilt. This seems 
correct, as far as it goes, but the reputational pathway account does not provide much by way of 
explaining why guilt itself evolved, since it dilutes the role guilt plays in prosocial behavior 




the particular disposition or motivation to cooperate. In our critique of Joyce’s and James’s 
evolutionary accounts below, we provide reasons why a predefection role for guilt does not fully 
explain why it might be an adaptation. 
 But consider a more serious problem for this account. Frank’s reputational pathway 
account considers reputation to be an important evolutionary driver for guilt. Now, the cognitive 
load involved in receiving, retaining, and transmitting information about the shifting reputations 
of multiple potential cooperators seems to require the sort of complex psychological machinery 
that would have evolved only in the context of complex human social interaction (Deem and 
Ramsey 2016; Sterelny 2012). Thus, Frank’s view of the reputation pathway appears to 
presuppose that which it wishes to explain, namely, communal stability and commitment within 
complex social environments.  
  
3.2 Joyce’s and James’s self-recrimination models of guilt. Like Frank, Joyce and James 
conceptualize guilt primarily as a kind of internal check on urges to defect or cheat on 
cooperative ventures. In contrast to Frank, Joyce and James seek to develop in more detail the 
specific role guilt plays in cooperation rather than leave its function undifferentiated from that of 
other social emotions. Joyce characterizes guilt as an “internal self-punishment system” (2006, 
70) that “guides action ‘from the inside’” (101). The action-guiding element of guilt stems from 
what Joyce sees as its close association with moral judgments about particular types of actions as 
deserving of punishment. On his view, this package of moral judgment and guilt was selected for 
because it “reinforced in a motivation-boosting way” (113) other social emotions, increasing the 
“likelihood that certain adaptive social behaviors [would] be performed” (114). James (2011) 




deserves punishment” (56), functioning as a “check” (75) on temptations to transgress norms. On 
the self-recrimination model, individuals wish to avoid the painful experience of guilt, making 
them more compliant with group norms and, consequently, better cooperators. 
 Joyce’s and James’s accounts face two problems, however. First, they portray guilt as 
straightforwardly adaptive, underwriting an individual’s prosocial behavior. But the question of 
whether guilt really is adaptive for the individual is more difficult than either lets on. Guilt has 
the potential to incur significant burdens for the individual, even as it plays the self-recrimination 
role with which Joyce and James associate it. Clinical studies of guilt proneness in individuals 
show a significant correlation between guilt experience and individual psychopathology, 
including depression, self-loathing, and heightened anxiety (Harder 1995; Zahn-Waxler et al. 
2012). Any individual-level account of guilt, then, must explain how these ostensibly 
maladaptive effects on the individual were offset by the benefits accrued by being guilt prone.  
 Perhaps one might argue that it is enough that guilt disposes individuals to resist 
temptations to defect on cooperative arrangements, thereby further strengthening cooperative 
tendencies that are underwritten by other prosocial emotions. This line of argument faces a 
significant challenge: Why would selection favor a novel, complex emotion with a presumably 
high maintenance cost just to reinforce these tendencies? Consider that recent neurobiological 
and primatological research shows guilt to be a cognitively complex emotion that might be 
unique to humans. For example, neurobiological research takes guilt experiences to be produced 
by complex subcortical and neocortical processes, which are associated with reduced asymmetry 
in right and left cortical activity and indicative of a unique simultaneous orientation toward 
withdrawal and approach behaviors (Amodio et al. 2007; Moll et al. 2008; Panksepp and Biven 




guilt as a relatively late phylogenetic addition in humans, which emerged only after early human 
communities had developed sustained cooperative structures and cultural systems of 
transmission and enforcement of social norms (Boehm 2012; Fessler and Gervais 2010). 
Moreover, as the contemporary psychological and legal literature we discussed in section 2 
shows, an important background condition for guilt experience is the individual’s capacity to 
recognize norms of behavior and to evaluate and take responsibility for one’s actions. As several 
biologists and philosophers have argued, the capacities to accept social norms and make 
evaluative judgments about one’s actions and those of others likely emerged comparatively late 
in human evolutionary history (Deem 2016; Laland and Brown 2011; Silk and Boyd 2010; 
Sterelny 2012). As human social arrangements achieved sufficient complexity, phylogenetically 
older tendencies instilled by, say, kin selection or reciprocal altruism likely became insufficient 
for generating cooperation on large scales.  
 If, as this broad set of research suggests, guilt is a neurobiologically complex and 
cognitively demanding emotion that emerged phylogenetically late within systems of human 
cooperation and cultural transmission, then it seems unlikely that selection would favor a novel 
and complex emotion simply to serve as a psychological reinforcement of cooperative tendencies 
that were underwritten by a suite of other, more phylogenetically ancient, emotions, such as 
sympathy, empathy, or fear. This is not to mention the potential fitness costs that guilt incurs pre- 
and post-transgression. For this scenario to be plausible, we need to know ways in which the 
fitness landscape changed, rendering these more phylogenetically ancient emotions and 
tendencies less reliable for underwriting cooperative arrangements and preventing individual 
defection. Importantly, Joyce and James ascribe to guilt the primary evolutionary function of 




behaviors associated with guilt experiences that seem to have the most important social 
ramifications for the individual, namely, postdefection expressions of guilt. One current role of 
guilt may well be the regulation of norm transgression, but in order for this to be a plausible 
candidate for guilt’s evolutionary function, we would need to know how it yielded sufficient 
biological benefit to offset the potential fitness costs of postdefection, guilt-induced behaviors. 
 This is not to deny that guilt can serve as a motivational counterweight to temptations to 
defect on cooperative schemes. Indeed, as we noted in section 2, the anticipation of guilt often 
modifies our motivational profile, dampening the allure of violating norms.  But it is to cast 
doubt on the notion that guilt was favored by selection primarily to serve this purpose or merely 
to increase the aggregate strength of the set of more phylogenetically ancient prosocial emotions. 
When we consider guilt’s late evolutionary emergence in humans along with its unique social 
and behavioral profile after transgression, we see that attributing the biological function of guilt 
solely to its role as a motivational counterweight leaves significant explanatory gaps in the 
evolutionary account.4  
 This leads to a second and more significant problem for Joyce’s and James’s accounts: 
neither considers how the action tendencies of guilt in postdefection scenarios would have been 
adaptive for individuals. Recall from the discussion in section 2 that guilt frequently induces a 
number of potentially costly behaviors for the individual, including public confession to 
wrongdoing, submission to punishment, and self-penance. In contemporary social and legal 
	
4  Whether the anticipation of guilt and its role in modifying one’s motivational profile are 
incidental effects of the main evolutionary function of guilt, or are themselves among the 




settings, guilt-induced behaviors tend to be met by specific responses by the community that 
benefit or mitigate harm to the individual who exhibits them. Neither Joyce nor James considers 
how guilt-induced behaviors render the individual vulnerable to group response to expressions of 
guilt, or why group response carries potential benefit to the individual. Why would members of 
early human groups respond positively to guilt-prone individuals? Guilt would hardly have been 
a boon to the individual if the expression of guilt were routinely discounted, ignored, or 
exploited by the community.5  
 Alternatively, and we think more plausibly, guilt-proneness might indeed reinforce these 
tendencies, but was likely favored, at least initial, by selection for its role in restoring 
cooperative arrangements after transgression. If this is right, guilt would still largely fit the 
descriptive profile that Joyce and James sketch when an individual considers defecting on 
communal norms or moral commitments, but would also enhance an individual’s derived 
benefits from cooperative enterprises insofar as guilt-induced behaviors play important roles in 
the restoration of relationships that norm transgressions altered. Joyce’s and James’s accounts 
do, however, shed significant light on why individuals might have been disposed to reveal 
	
5 One might object that the presence of prosocial emotions would preclude or dampen drives to 
exploit the guilt prone. We might respond by noting that while prosocial emotions such as 
sympathy and empathy dispose individuals to help, assist, refrain from harm, etc., they are 
variably expressed in behavior and might be counterbalanced by other evolved dispositions. We 
could think of exploitation in terms of sadistic expressions of, say, anger or even malice, but we 
can also think of it in terms of severe punishment that is viewed as justified within contexts 




otherwise concealed transgressions or perform actions such as apology and restitution, despite 
facing punishment from others. On these self-recrimination accounts, individuals often feel they 
ought to be punished. But even if this self-recrimination prompts such behaviors, we still need an 
explanation for why revealing one’s transgressions or placing oneself before the mercy and 
judgment of the group appears to be a stable adaptive strategy. In the following section, the 
account of the evolutionary origins of guilt we introduce uses an ingredient absent from those of 
Frank, Joyce, James, and others: empathy. Empathy in humans, we argue, likely preceded the 
evolution of guilt, and this fact is a key to the full understanding how guilt evolved. As we will 
show, the inclusion of empathy in an evolutionary account of guilt uniquely enables us to make 
sense of posttransgression responses to expressions of guilt, thereby laying the groundwork for 
an individual-level adaptive story for guilt’s origin and maintenance. 
 
4. Guilt, empathic distress, and the restoration of cooperation 
4.1 Explaining group response to guilt. If guilt is potentially psychologically and socially 
maladaptive for the individual, as the empirical literature suggests, how might we explain the 
evolution of guilt without recourse to a group selection model? We are not assuming that group-
level selection scenarios are outright untenable. Indeed, it may be that being composed of guilt-
prone individuals provided groups with a competitive advantage. There are ongoing debates 
about the tenability of group selection models and whether group selection can in some cases 
swamp the effects of individual-level selection. Some group selection models have been 
strengthened by the addition of culture, since culture can have the effect of increasing intragroup 
homogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity, increasing group-level selection pressures. Such 




Richerson et al., 2016). However, it is not yet clear that cultural group selection can provide 
adequate explanations of the evolution of guilt. As Nesse (2016) argues, cultural group selection 
“has a hard time explaining the pervasiveness and intensity of guilt, motivations for reparations, 
extreme sensitivity to what others think, concern for others’ welfare, pity, commitment, empathy, 
philanthropy, and pride in generosity” (35). Furthermore, group-level explanations suffer from 
the fact that it is unclear whether group-level selection alone was strong enough for guilt to 
evolve (Deem and Ramsey 2016). Such explanations appear better at accounting for the spread 
of guilt proneness through the species than the origins of guilt proneness in individuals. 
Even if one thinks that one can produce tenable group selection models of the evolution 
of guilt, it is important to ask whether such models are necessary—whether, that is, there are 
viable evolutionary accounts of guilt that do not require the resources of a group-level selection 
framework. At any rate, our primary aim in this paper is to identify the minimal components 
required for an individual-level selectionist account of guilt, remaining neutral on whether and to 
what degree guilt proneness as a trait gained an evolutionary foothold through genetic or cultural 
(e.g., individual-to-individual, across generations) transmission. 
Perhaps the way in which an individual tends to alleviate guilt can provide some 
guidance here. There is evidence that the psychologically maladaptive effects of guilt are 
strongly mitigated by opportunities for the guilt-experiencing individual to make amends with 
those parties who were harmed by a particular transgression (Estrada-Hollenbeck 1998). But the 
alleviation of guilt along this route presupposes that the group members are willing to restore the 
guilt-prone individual to some positive degree of social standing and reincorporate the individual 
in cooperative enterprises. This is precisely what the aforementioned individual-level accounts 




behaviors were not met with positive responses from group members. In this scenario, it might 
indeed pay to be successfully deceptive or demure about one’s own transgressions, while 
signaling falsely one’s acceptance of communal norms. Thus, merely pointing to the way guilt 
checks motivations to defect, or even noting the reparative behaviors it induces, is not sufficient 
to show why guilt was adaptive for the individual. Moreover, merely positing that guilt made 
individuals better facilitators of community benefits is too vague; it does little to differentiate the 
evolutionary and behavioral profile of guilt from those of other social emotions, and altogether 
ignores what is most puzzling about guilt’s evolution. The communal attitudes and responses to 
postdefection displays of guilt must be given an important place within any plausible individual-
level explanation of guilt.  
 The foregoing discussion suggests that constructing an adequate individual-level account 
of guilt demands explanation both of why guilt proneness is adaptive for the individual, despite 
its connection to maladaptive behaviors and psychopathology, and why others tend to forgive 
and reincorporate, rather than exploit or banish, individuals who perform costly reparative 
behaviors.  
 
4.2 Behavioral Regulation and Post-transgression Risks. Guilt’s role, then, as a regulator 
of norm transgression and indicator of such regulation, while important, is a poor candidate for 
the emotion’s main evolutionary function. If an account focuses only on how guilt affects the 
motivational and behavioral profiles of individuals, particularly as it mitigates temptation to 
defect, then it neglects what is perhaps the more evolutionarily significant dimension of guilt; 
namely, how it elicits responses from conspecifics that benefit the guilt-prone individual. This is 




responses from conspecifics that level high costs to the individual. Any plausible evolutionary 
perspective on guilt, then, must explain why individuals who experienced and displayed guilt 
altered the motivational and behavioral profiles of their conspecifics, effecting the individual’s 
posttransgression reintegration into communal life.  
As we discussed in section 2, an individual’s expressions of guilt in contemporary social 
and legal contexts are often met with responses by others that produce some benefit for the 
individual (e.g., reincorporation into cooperative arrangements), or mitigate costs imposed on the 
individual due to others’ perception of the individual’s responsibility for a transgression (e.g., 
leniency in legal sentencing). An evolutionary account of guilt must consider these 
posttransgression benefits that expressions of guilt provide for the individual. But what accounts 
for the broadly positive attitudes of conspecifics toward an individual who, motivated by guilt, 
indicates that s/he is suffering the pangs of guilt or that s/he wishes to repair damage to 
relationships caused by norm transgression?  
To answer to these questions, we must consider what dispositions were already present in 
individuals prior to the evolutionary emergence of guilt such that guilt-induced behaviors would 
have been regarded positively, leading to benefits for the guilt-prone individual. The earlier 
evolution of empathy in humans, we contend, provides a crucial piece of the explanation for how 
guilt might have been individually adaptive at its emergence. 
 
4.3 Empathic response as a key evolutionary driver. There is considerable variability 




we do not attempt here to provide a complete descriptive account.6 However, there is some 
convergence within the contemporary literature on at least three key features of empathy, which 
we take to be important to explaining how guilt gained an evolutionary foothold. First, empathy 
has an affective aspect: an empathic state involves an experiencing of the positive or negative 
valence of another individual’s affective state (Coplan 2011; de Waal 2006; Hatfield et al. 2009). 
Whether this includes an additional epistemic state of being aware of how that individual feels or 
clear self-other differentiation is a matter of considerable philosophical debate into which we do 
not enter here (Batson and Weeks 1996; Coplan 2011; Smith 2017). Second, empathy tends to be 
self-focused: the experience of empathy primarily involves focus on one’s own experience of this 
negative or positive valence, as opposed to taking on another’s perspective or imagining oneself 
as if being in another’s position (Batson et al. 1997; Miller 2011; Snow 2000). Third, empathy is 
associated with a behavioral response to one’s negative or positive affective experience. Some 
researchers claim that empathy typically motivates behaviors aimed at enhancing the welfare of 
another individual and to produce a positive affect in one’s self (de Waal 2008; Eisenberg et al. 
2006). 
	
6 Batson (2009), Coplan (2011), and Smith (2017) note that the term ‘empathy’ is used by 
philosophers and scientists to pick out a number of different neurological, psychological, and 
behavior phenomena, including mirroring or catching others’ emotional states, imagining other’s 
affective states, picturing ourselves as experiencing others’ affective states, and feeling the 
others’ emotions. The very broad description of empathy on which we rely here is consistent 





At the very least, it seems that empathic response is motivated in large part to enhance 
one’s own positive affect or diminish one’s own negative affect, and this often involves actions 
directed toward another insofar as perception of the latter’s affective experience plays a 
determining role in one’s empathic experience (Batson et al. 2016). This minimal conception of 
empathy, which some social psychologists have called “empathic” or “personal” distress (Batson 
2009; Hoffman 1981), stands in contrast to more robust conceptions of empathic concern that 
include eliciting behaviors also aimed at relieving the distress of others.7 For our purposes here, 
we assume what seems to be a baseline consensus that empathy involves at least the 
experiencing of the positive or negative valence of another’s emotional state and motivates 
behaviors that are associated with preserving or alleviating this euphoric or dysphoric 
experience. These two features of empathy, we contend, help to explain how guilt evolved in 
early human social contexts and rendered guilt adaptive for individuals. 
For our claim to be plausible, we first need evidence that empathy preceded guilt on the 
evolutionary timescale and that empathy plays a significant role in the social restoration of 
individuals who transgress norms and subsequently express their guilt experiences. There is 
empirical evidence that the evolutionary emergence of empathy preceded that of guilt. Animal 
researchers claim that rudimentary forms of empathy are phylogenetically widespread, being 
found in a range of taxa (Langford et al. 2006; Povinelli et al. 1992; de Waal 2008). De Waal for 
example, claims that nonhuman primates exhibit susceptibility to other troop members’ negative 
affective states. This phenomenon, frequently dubbed emotional contagion, involves negative 
	
7 For a helpful disentangling of the many senses of ‘empathy’ in the philosophical and 




affective states in individuals inducing “a matching or closely related state” in others, and 
motivating response behaviors aimed at relieving the distress caused by the shared states (2006, 
26). In contrast to empathy and its rudimentary forms across taxa, the cognitive machinery 
underlying guilt experiences is highly complex and perhaps unique to humans, suggesting that 
guilt might not be phylogenetically widespread (Amodio et al. 2007; Boehm 2012; Deem and 
Ramsey 2016). This provides evidence that guilt had a later evolutionary emergence than even 
the more robust form of empathy described by De Waal, and we can plausibly maintain that guilt 
in humans evolved within a social context in which, minimally, susceptibility to empathic 
distress was already established.  
 The claim that empathy provided a pathway for guilt to evolve can be strengthened by 
considering current psychological research on the experience and effects of empathy. Empirical 
studies of empathy-related responses of children and adults show that among empathy’s primary 
functions are to render subjects sensitive to the emotional distress of others, to vicariously 
participate in this distress, and to prompt behaviors aimed directly at its alleviation in the agent 
or both parties, which frequently is achieved via the enhancement of the welfare of the party in 
whom emotional distress was initially detected (Eisenberg et al. 2006; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1995). 
Successful alleviation of this distress is associated with experiences of positive affect, suggesting 
empathic response is associated with benefit to the empathic party (Batson and Weeks 1996). 
Experiences of empathy are also strongly associated with diminished anger and aggression 
toward others (Harmon-Jones 2004; Jagers et al. 2007; Strayer and Roberts 2004), and there is 





 From this psychological research on empathy, we can draw two plausible (but non-
demonstrative) conclusions about the evolutionary interplay between empathy and guilt. First, as 
we observed in section 2, guilt experiences are negative affective states. From an evolutionary 
perspective, early experiences of guilt, if detected by others (more on this below), would likely 
affect others’ emotional states to some degree. Sensitivity to the emotional distress of guilt in 
others, then, would likely have influenced others’ motivational profiles via empathic distress at 
the very least, potentially prompting bystanders to behave in ways to alleviate or eliminate their 
own distress, perhaps along with the distress observed in the other. Second, this empathic 
experience in view of another’s distressing guilt experience would likely have dampened anger 
and aggression toward that individual. While aggression and anger would have been responses to 
an individual’s perceived norm transgression—and, again, we take no stand on whether what is 
represented is the transgression itself or a relation-dependent property of representing harm—the 
experience of empathy would potentially reduce urges to severely punish, return harm, or expel 
from cooperative arrangements. 
One effect of empathy is that the perceived suffering of another individual causes in one 
distress and compels one to relieve one’s own negative affect, often via attempts to relieve the 
other’s pain.8 Now, this need not be motivated by an express concern for the other—indeed, we 
can imagine that relieving another’s distress could be taken merely instrumentally as a way to 
alleviate one’s own empathic distress.  Our ancestors, then, would also have been compelled to 
	
8 Again, we leave aside the question about the actual motivation one has in such behaviors—
whether it is exclusively to relieve one’s own distress or also admits the drive to relieve the 




reduce the suffering—physical and psychological—of others, either directly or indirectly. The 
emotional suffering of guilt, of course, would be something transgressors would try to avoid and 
to ameliorate. But as long as others in the group were susceptible either to empathic distress or 
empathic concern, many would be inclined to aid in mitigating and eliminating this suffering. 
The group could do this in two ways: the anticipated pain of guilt would lead to group members 
encouraging others to avoid transgressions (e.g., “Think of how you’ll feel”; “How could you 
live with yourself?”), and detecting guilt experiences in individuals would reduce aggression 
toward transgressors, encourage group members to forgive transgressors, or relax the 
implementation of punishment norms on transgressors. Thus, according to our evolutionary 
perspective on guilt, the key affective and behavioral aspects of empathy noted in the empirical 
literature would have contributed to the individual-level benefit of guilt experience and 
expression at their evolutionary emergence. Furthermore, an individual’s expression of guilt in 
posttransgression scenarios could then be an effective adaptive strategy for alleviation of 
affective distress and reincorporation in cooperative ventures.9 
 
 4.4 Reliable guilt signaling as protection against exploitation. For guilt-induced behavior to be a 
fairly reliable indicator of whether an individual is experiencing emotional distress over 
transgressing norms and whether they are likely to recidivate, individuals’ empathic capacities 
	
9 Some philosophers and psychologists have argued that empathy does not necessarily lead to 
norm acceptance, or that actions motivated by empathy are always morally praiseworthy (Bloom 





and the group’s punitive system cannot be open to easy exploitation. After all, there may be large 
payoffs to individuals who can successfully feign experiencing guilt and gain forgiveness 
without the intent of changing their behavior—for example, by exhibiting a “hangdog” look 
without actually feeling any guilt. Psychopaths, to cite a contemporary example, have high 
recidivation rates, and yet are the most successful at gaining conditional release when they go up 
for parole (Porter et al., 2009). Intuitively, one might find it plausible that individuals who were 
particularly adept at concealing their transgressions or feigning guilt behaviors could reap the 
benefits of group forgiveness without suffering from feelings of self-recrimination or other 
maladaptive effects. Wouldn’t such individuals be better off than individuals who experience 
guilt and display guilt-induced behaviors? If all things were equal, this might indeed be 
persuasive. But all things are not equal. If guilt has a relatively late evolutionary emergence in 
hominins, as we have supposed, then it seems a relatively stable suite of prosocial emotions—
including empathy—would already have been established, driven in part by pressures favoring 
traits that secured and preserved cooperation. Presumably, this mitigated to some degree the 
threat of deception within cooperative arrangements for individual gain.  
Moreover, as we and others have argued, for guilt to be reliably signaled, significant 
costs would attach to such signaling. It is reasonable to suppose that the motivation to take on 
such costs is more reliably produced by the feeling of self-recrimination (à la Joyce and James) 
than by coolly calculated deception. Further, as Sterelny has argued in response to concerns that 
deceivers would overrun cooperative systems that rely to some degree on group signaling, even 
if deception prevailed in a least some individual cases, its threat would have been relatively low 




and informational pooling precedes using information for planning and acting (Sterelny 2012). A 
deceiver likely succeeds, in other words, when no one else checks on the lie. 
But there are two ways by which fake signals of guilt may be rendered less effective 
within social contexts. First, the capacities for memory and the communication of fine-grained 
information about individuals’ reputation for cooperation render such exploitation much more 
difficult. While someone may be able to get away with this deception within the relative 
anonymity of a large prison system, this would not be so easily accomplished in a smaller 
community of early humans with normalized social relations. If individuals were able to 
remember and communicate detailed information about the actions of others with whom they 
have interacted, they would be able to better distinguish earnest expressions of guilt from 
fraudulent ones, as well as move beyond firsthand experience in judging the relative degree of 
earnestness in attempts to seek forgiveness. However, there would be a significant cost in terms 
of time and biological maintenance of these memorial and communicative capacities, and it is 
reasonable to assume that competing adaptive trade-offs would result in a non-optimal leveling 
of their power. 
However, a second and perhaps more effective way to prevent both the exploitation by 
fakers of guilt proneness, and the dissemination of inaccurate reputations about the guilt 
proneness of individuals, would be through reliable signaling of guilt. Recall Frank’s sincere-
manner pathway, along which hard-to-fake facial expressions serve as signals by which the 
group can accurately detect in individuals the presence of important social emotions. Guilt, we 
have seen, has no such telling facial or bodily expression, so Frank’s account does not 
straightforwardly explain the reliable signaling of guilt. But there is no reason to suppose that the 




risk and potentially enormous costs individuals incur by confessing their transgressions, 
submitting to potential punishment, and performing reparative actions, can serve as credible 
signals of guilt experience. Mimicry of guilt-prone individuals, then, would not only come at a 
high price to the individual who attempts to exploit the forgiveness of others and seek the 
dampening of their punishment after transgression, but would also involve having to perform 
these costly actions presumably without the guilt experience that typically motivates and sustains 
them. While this is no guarantee that guilt could never be successfully feigned, the performance 
of these potentially costly and maladaptive behaviors would have enabled members of groups to 
infer the high probability that an individual is actually experiencing guilt due to a transgression 
(Deem and Ramsey 2016).  
Other evolutionary accounts of guilt have also converged on the hypothesis that a costly 
signal might be required for expressions of guilt to yield individual-level benefits.  Martinez-
Vaquero et al. (2015), O’Connor (2016), and Pereiro et al. (2017a) provide a different avenue to 
this conclusion through the use of evolutionary game theory modeling. Their models of guilt 
show that apology after broken commitment and the subsequent restoration of cooperative 
arrangements between transgressor and transgressed can yield fitness benefits to each under 
conditions of revenge, apology, and forgiveness. However, in order for the apology to function 
as a reliable signal of a willingness to recommitment to cooperative arrangements, Martinez-
Vaquero et al. (2015) conclude that the apology must cross a “sincerity threshold…where the 
cost of apologising should exceed that of cooperation” (8), where the cost of cooperation is the 
risk of defection. In mixed state games, where a population consists of both apology proposers 
and acceptors, Martinez-Vaquero et al. (2017) conclude that if the apology cost is too low, then 




and Pereira et al. (2017b) conclude that a significant cost to apologize is needed to lower the 
probability that fakers can exploit cooperative arrangements by feigning guilt and that dishonest 
apologizers will evolve. In addition to concluding that the costs of guilt expression to the 
individual must cross a high enough threshold in order to be reliable signals of cooperative 
intent, the Martinez-Varquero et al., O’Connor, and Pereira et al. models suggest that these costs 
must not be so high that they cannot be absorbed by the individual. In their discussion of their 
respective models, Martinez-Varquero et al. (2015) and O’Connor (2016) conclude that the costs 
to the individual must be capped in some way. Otherwise, guilt expressions cannot be an 
evolutionary stable strategy. Perreira et al. (2017b) conclude that if this cost is too high, then 
revenge will dominate apology as a cooperative strategy.  
None of these models, however, specifies what would create this cap on the costs to guilt-
prone individuals. Extensions of these evolutionary game theoretic models in Rosenstock and 
O’Connor (2018) and Pereira et al. (2017a) provide some basis for explaining this posited cap on 
costs. On Rosenstock and O’Connor’s model, guilt-prone individuals are willing to pay a cost in 
order to apologize for defection and show a willingness to cooperate in future interactions. Using 
a model in which one player’s guilt expression occurs without detecting guilt proneness in other 
players, Pereira et al. (2017b) conclude that guilt-prone individuals will be exploited by non-
guilt-prone conspecifics. Under such conditions, guilt proneness and its expression appears to 
carry a very high cost. On a second model that stipulates that an individual will experience 
postdefection guilt when a co-player acts prosocially toward the individual or has also displayed 
guilt, Pereira et al. (2017b) conclude that guilt proneness in a population will enhance 




Both the Rosenstock and O’Connor (2018) and Pereira et al. (2017b) models suggest that 
the cost of guilt expression is curbed by prosocial behavior toward apology on the part of 
conspecifics, but neither model provides any specification for what psychological trait might 
undergird that response. Empathic concern for the guilt-prone individual’s distress, we contend, 
is a good candidate for serving as this effective limit to the costs of guilty apology, since it 
explains both why players accept apology and why guilt-prone individuals do not exact the kinds 
of high cost we outline above, such as exploitation, severe punishment, or social exile. Reliable 
signaling of guilt through costly apology induces empathic concern in the transgressed, 
motivating forgiveness and the recommencement of cooperation. Our account of the relation 
between guilt and empathy, then, has the virtue not only of being consistent with these game-
theoretic models of the evolution of guilt, but also of providing additional support to them by 
supplying a key condition for explaining how guilt-induced behavior could yield benefits to the 
individual. 
Let’s take stock of the foregoing empirical and conceptual considerations. Our ancestors 
likely were empathic before they were guilt prone. While the individual’s anticipation of guilt 
could decrease the motivation to violate normative standards, it was the empathic context in 
which guilt emerged that was the decisive factor in the evolution of guilt. Empathic concern for 
the emotional distress of guilt likely reduced aggression toward guilt-prone norm breakers, and 
enabled others to vicariously participate in their emotional distress. Empathy, then, would have 
prompted behaviors aimed at mitigating guilt distress, including forgiving guilt-laden individuals 
and reincorporating them into cooperative arrangements. The high cost of expressing guilt, and 
the capacities to retain and communicate reputations of guilt proneness, would make guilt 




subsequent benefits of being forgiven and reincorporated into cooperative arrangements, then, 
would have made expressing guilt a stable adaptive strategy for the individual. Empathy, 
curiously absent from current evolutionary explanations of guilt, thus is likely a central 
component in the explanation of the evolution of guilt proneness. 
 
5. Conclusions. It is widely agreed that guilt evolved to play an important role in human 
cooperation. But, as we have seen, guilt poses a unique evolutionary puzzle, given that its 
expression occurs postdefection, leaving the guilt-prone individual at the mercy of the group’s 
judgment.  Reviewing the solutions offered by James, Joyce, and Frank, we found that although 
their accounts have merit, none completely solves this puzzle. Our alternative solution, which 
draws on the contemporary empirical and game-theoretic literature on guilt, emphasizes the role 
of posttransgression behavior and the centrality of empathy in the evolution of guilt. Our account 
both leverages the maladaptive features of guilt that the other accounts have a difficult time 
accounting for, and provides a solution as to why groups would respond positively to individuals 
whose guilt displays were costly enough to signal reliably an intent to restore cooperative 
relations. Our account thus offers a better solution to the puzzle of why guilt evolved to play its 
distinctive social role, and sheds light on the complex relation between guilt expressions and the 
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